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The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard
ABSTRACT
Thispaper develcçs the basic analytica of noral hazard, for the
two-a.itcxzie case where either a fixed damage accident oirs or it does
riot.The analysis focuses on the relationship between the insurance
premium paid ar the insurance benefits received in the event of an
accident, ar is corducted in benefit-premium space.The central
massage of the paper is that even when the urd.erlyirg functions, the
expected utility function ard the function relatim the accident
prthability to accident-prevention effort, are extrQly well-behaved,
the irdifference curves ard feasibility set (the set of insurance
contracts which at least break even) are not—irdifference curves need
not be convex arxl feasibility sets never are; price-ard inccze-
consunption lines may be discontinucus; ard effort is not in general a
ircriotonic or continucus function of the paramaters of the insurance
policies provided.
Part I of this paper establishes these results, while Part II
discusses scm of their iirplications. The bad behavior of irdifference
curves ard the feasibility set profirdly affects the nature ard
existence of cxxpetitive &iuilibrium. We illustrate this, thcxzh we do
not provide a thorough analysis. We also show that cxir canonical nodel
of an insurance market with noral hazard can be reinterpreted to
provide a nodel of loans with bankruptcy, or of work incentives.
Note: ä= , , A
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CANADAThe Basicnalvticsof Moral Hazard
In the staixard (ArrcM-Debreu) carpetitive treatnnt of risk, the
states of nature, which occur with exogencxis probabilities, are
observable.Insurance cxntiient on the realized state entails lump-
siun transfers across states aixi therefore has no incentive or
substitution effects.
Moral hazard arises when neither the states of nature nor
irxiividuals' actions are observable to an insurer)- What is observable
is whether a particular accident has occurred. tJrxler these cor3itions,
there is no ucthanism by which the insurer can iixiuce the insured to
reveal either the state of nature or his level of precaution
truthfully. Thus, the insured-against events are accidents of varyir
drees of severity, cor.itional on neither the state of nature nor the
insured's actions. The provision of insurance against such events will
generally affect the iixiividual's incentives to take precautions2—
i.e., have substitution effects. There is therefore a tradeoff between
incentives ard risk-bearing. This is the noral hazard problan.
Moral hazard is pervasive in the econany. It occurs whenever risk
is present, iriiividuals are risk-averse, arKi "effort" is costly to
itcriitor. rd it arises not only in insurance markets, but also when
1this is the extreme fonn of noral hazard. Moral hazard probl
arise, thcugh they are diluted, when the states of nature ar/or
irK3.ividuals' actions are imperfectly observable (observable with noise).
2The provision of insurance therefore affects the probabilities of
the events. For this reason, we define noral hazard to arise when the
provision of insurance affects the probabilities of the insured-against
events.
2insurance is provided by governments, thrc.igh social institutions, or
in principal-agent cx)ntracts.
This paper develops the basic analytics of ncral hazard.The
analysis focuses on the relationship between the insurance premium paid
ar the insurance benefits received in the event of an accident.We
derive the properties of the irxlifference curves ar of the feasibility
set, the set of insurance contracts which at leastbreak even. The
central massage of the paper is that even when the ur1er1yir
functions, the expected utility function ar the relationship between
ef fort ax the accident prcabi1ity, are extremaly well-behaved, the
irdifference curves arxl feasibility sets are not—ir*.ifference curves
need not be convex ari feasibility sets never are; price- axx macma-
consumption lines may be discontinuous; arxl effort is not in general a
irriotonic or continuous function of the pararreters of the insurance
policies provided or of the prices of goods.
Part I of this paper establishes these results, while Part II
discusses sate of their iit,lications. We shc that our canonical nidel
of an insurance market can be reinterpreted to provide a imde1 of loans
with bankruptcy, or of work incentives. The properties that we uncover
here have profour implications for the nature arxl existence of
cctrpetitive equilibrium. We illustrate sare of these
ecause of space limitations, we provide a thorcigh analysis of
the nature ar existence of ccetitive equilibrium in a cipanion
paper (Arnott ani Stiglitz [1987a]).
3Part I: Basic Analytics
1. The Wdel
Thra.ighout ncst of the paper we shall enploy the sinpiest model in
which moral hazard is present. Each irxIividual in the econciny engages
in a single activity that has two possible outxues, which we refer to
as "accident" arKi "no accident" .'Thec*itxit of the econcany is a
consuirption good which is the only good in the ncany. n
ir1ividual 's level of outp.it (his consumption or inccsne in the absence
of insurance) depends on whether or not an accident occurs to him. The
probability of an individual havirg an accident is a function of his
accident-prevention effort,5 and different individuals' accident
probabilities are statistically iixleperdent. To isolate the ithencarena
arising fran moral hazard (fran those which would arise if there were
adverse selection as well) we assurre that individuals are identical.
Alternatively, we could assume that insurers can observe all the
relevant characteristics of the insured (except, of course, effort),
and interpret cur analysis as applying to a group with the sarre
characteristics.
Because they are risk-averse, individuals will want to insure
against the accident. We assuxte that whoever provides the insurance
4One nay instead interpret the two aitcares as "large damage
conditional on an accident occurrixg" and "nall damage conditional on
an accident occurring."
5Our analysis is sufficiently general that effort may be
interpreted variously as exertion, the tiit spent in accident-
prevention activity, the nature (unpleasantness) of the accident-
prevention activity undertaken, and (for saxe utility functions) units
of the consumption good used up in accident prevention.
4can serve whether the accident has occurred,bit neither the
urIerlyin states of nature norirdividuals'effort levels—this is the
informationalasynintty which gives rise to the ural hazard prthln.
Thus, insurance is provided against the accident. As iireinsurance is
provided, the marginal private benefit to the inlividualof experdirg a
given level of effort on accident prevention falls; as a result,he
will teni to eqerd less effort which will increase the probability of
his havirg an accident.
We denote by YoarYi consurrtion in the events noaccident
ard accident, respectively. In the absence of insurance
y0=w y1=w-d,
wherew is the no-accident out.it ardd the damage dueto the
accident,so that w-d is the accident outpit. We characterize an
insurance policy intermof a net (ofpriuin)payout orbenefit,a
which the inlividual receives in the event of accident, ard a premii,
19, whichthe irdividual pays ifanaccident does not occur.6 Thus,
with insurance
y=w-/3ardYl=w-d+a. (l.la,b)
The probability, p ,thatanaccident occurs to an irdividualis
a function of his levelof (accident-prevention) effort, e .Atsate
pointsin the paper, we shall asstm that the irdividual has a choice
of only a discrete nuither of effort levels, each corresporxlir to a
different accident-prevention activity or technique.In this case,
effort n1 not be quantified. We denote by pJ theprobability of
6Thiscorrespords to an insurance policy with 9 payable in both
events, ard a gross payout in the event of accident of a+19
5accident when effort level jischosen, ar bythe prc1abi1ity of
accident when nothir is done to prevent the accident.7 we ass.m that
< 1 —with no effort an accident need not occur.
At other points in the paper, we shall asstm that the ir1ividual
has a choice over a continuum of effort levels, we assi.nt that nre
effort always reduces the pr±ability of accident ar does so in a
continucus manner, and we cardinal ize effort in such a way that e=O
with zero effort and p (e) is strictly convex and analytic for e > 0.
Thus, p'(e) <0ard p"(e) >0for e> 0 .Forthis case, too, we
assun that p(O)p < 1we refer to p(e) as the prcbability-of-
accident function.
The individual 's expected utility is
EU =(1—pJ)UJ0(y0)+ pJUJ1(y1) (1.2a)
in the discrete effort levels case, where J0 is the individual 'S
utility function with effort jifan accident does not occur, aixi
Ui1thecorrespordir utility function when an accidentdoesoccur.
In the continuum of effort levels case, expected utility is
EXJ=(1—p(e))U0(y0,e) +p(e)U1(y1,e). (l.2b)
au. a2U
We assuxre thata> 21 <0 ,i=0,1 ;i.e •,ineach
äy
eventand forevery effort level, there is positive but diitinishir
marginal utility of consunption. For the continuumof effort
7wlli the iidividual to mix activities on the assunption that
p =EUp3 where U] is the prcportion of "time" he devotes
:i
devotes to accident-prevention activity j
6äU.
levels case we shall ass ackitionally that<0 ar
a2U ä2U.
ae2
,8.it shall place rreztions°'' äye
In imid of the subsequent analysis, it will prove insightfulto
focus on certain restricted classes of utility functions.Sattiiies we
shall treat expected utility functions of the form
EU =(l—PJ)u0(y0) +pJu1(y1)
—eJ (l.2ai)
in the discrete effort levels case, ar
EU =(l—p(e))u0(y0) +p(e)u1(y1)
—e (l.2bi)
in the continuum of effort levels case. We refer to these as separable
expectedutility functions.Note that to go fran(l.2a)to (l.2ai) an
fran(l.2b) to (l.2bi) requires three assumptions:first, that utility
in both events isstronglyseparable inconsumptionar effort; secoixi,
that the disutility of effort is event-iMeperKlent9ardthird, that
effortis measured by the disutility itcauses.For part of the
analysis,we go furtherard assume that theutility-of-consuliption
functionis also event-irdepenjent, thatisU,J(y)=u1(y)for all
y.Thegeneral theory requires, of ccurse, neithertheassumption of
separability northat ofevent-iixleperdence. Cxr objective is to shcM
thatevenwith thesestrongassuirptions, the irdifference curves aixi
feasibility setwillnotbewell-bthaved.
8Sfrce the cardinalization of e has been chosen so that
p(e)is convex, this assumption is restrictive.
9Th1sassumptionard the previcusone are natural ifcur iixdel is
interpreted as static, sincenormally wethink of effort as occurring
prior to the realization of the event ard prior to consumption.These
twoassumptionsare less reasonable ifinstead cur indel is interpreted
as describing a stationary state.
7Unless specified otherwise, we asstme separability.We consider
sate of the cczrçlications that arise with non-separable utility in
sections 4ar6.3.
2. Ill-Behaved Consuners with Well-Behaved Utility Functions:
The Peculiar Share of Irdifference Oitves
2.1 Discrete effort levels.
We define vJ(aj3)tobe the expected utility as a function of cr
arJ3 when effort level jischosen in the discrete effort levels
case,i.e., VJ(a,/3) =(1-pJ)UJ0(w-/3)+ pJUJ1(w-d+a)Eui.i.etv)
be the irdifferencecurve in a-space alorwhichexpected utility
is V with effort level j. Fmu(1. 2ai), with separability the
slope of such an effort-fixed irx3.ifferencecurve at(a,3) is
____up =— ( ) = .s(a,f3)> 0, (2.1)
aaP/a,8u(l-p3)
wherea 'denotesa derivative ar s is the marginal rate of
substitutionbetween a ai fiwitheffort level j.Theslope
is positive because a is a good aris a bad. Let
U"
A0 ()- —4 denotethe (local) coefficient of absolute risk
U0
aversion in the no-accident event with premium fi,
U,'
A1(a)-
j—4denote the corresporin coefficient in the event of
1
accident. Then the curvature of the effort-fixed irK3.ifference curve
can be shn to be
=— s(A,1+s3A0)< 0. (2.2) da
8Thus, effort-fixed irdifferex airv are strictly wex.
reflectiiø the ixitvidua1's aversion to risk. Also sixKe
a is a good az fiabad, 1c,er effort-fixed infffference
irves are preferred.Theserelts are shin in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1
We consider the case with to effort levels—high (H)
arxi lc* (L). Frcau (1.2ai), with the axtitrary insurance
package(a,)ar associated consunYtiOn levels (y1,y0)






with lz effort. Frcan(2.1)
H u(Y1)
Hu(y1) L L
s (a,/3) = (p (p=s(a,) , (2.4)
ut( )1—u'( )1— 00 00
sinceL >pH(withhigher effort, the probability of accident is
1crier). At any pointina- space, the 1i-effort irdifferencecurve
issteeper than the high-effort irdifferencecurvesincewith1czer
effortthe probability of accident is higher, an therefore tomaintain
the sane level of utility, the irdividualrequires a nal1er increase
inpayittocczrpensate for a given increase in prium.





Aior which we refer to as the switdiiri locus, iix3ividuals are
irdifferent between the two effort levels; i.e. I1, L is the locus of
(a,)such that UJ(Yo)
-u1(1)=H,L.Eq.(2.5) ilTplies that at
lc.jlevels of isurance (bel 0H, L) irKitviduals choose high effort,
while at high levels of insurance they choose 1cM effort, which accords
with intui-°
Insert Figure 2
We may nc define an irdifference curve with erdogenous effort
(hereafter sinply initfference curve) corespoiiliog to V=Vtobe the
locus of(a,3)such that max (Vl(a,/3),VL(a,/3)) =V.Since
irdividuals choose high effort for (a,/3)belcM parxl lieffort
for(a, )above0H, L ,thenthe iniifference curve Vcoincides
withv1below 4H,L jjvLuabove it.FranFigure 2, this
iiplies that an iixlifference curve is the uer envelope of the
correspotxlini effort-fixed irdifference curves, ard furthernore that it
hasan escalloped shape arviis therefore notconvex.
The above argunnt generalizes straightforwardly to thecasewhere
there is an arbitrary nunter of discrete effort levels. Hence, with
sevarable utility, as itore insurance is provided, the inltvidual
l0 assune that high effort is chosen with zero insurance.
10ctiooses sucxessivelv l,erlevelsof effort. FurthernEre. irxiifference
curves are rt convex.
2.2 ntinuum of effort levels
Expectedutility is a functionof a ,/3 , are; i.e.,
=1J(a,$,e).Weassim the irdividual chooses the level of effort
taking aar /3asfixed; thus,
e(a,/3) =argmaxEXJ(a,/3,e) , (2.6)
which we refer to as the effort supply function. Substitutionof (2.6)
intoEIJ(a,/3,e)yields V(a,13) ,whichgives expected utility as a
function of the benefit aria premium. We nc investigate the prcerties
of the correspordirig ir1ifference curves.
Usir theerivelcpe theorem, itfolls frau (l.2bi) that
=sar = +
(1—p2da '(2.7a,b)
where s ,isthe marginal rate of substitution between
pU0
a ani /3arid r u/u is the ratio of marginal utilities. The
expression in curly brackets in (2.7b) is native, reflectirthe
observation made earlierthat, witheffort fixed,irdifferencecurves
waldbe strictly convexbecause of riskaversion(recall Figure 1).
alt increasing the anntofinsurance decreases effort (we shallprove
thisshortly)arid increases the probability of accident, which effect
by itself causes irdifferences curves to be concave;thisiscaptured
by the second tenn in (2.7b) which ispositive(p' <0,r> 0
<0).Thus,thereis one effectcausing indifference
curves to be convex, arid another causing them tobe concave. TO
11ascertain which effect daninates requires evaluating-
V




(-U0(y0)+u1 (y1) )p'is the marginal private benefit of effort
in utility tern, the decrease in the prcbability of accident timas
the gain in utility fran not having an accident, while 1 is the
marginal cost. Since p"(e) >0,thesecoi-order conlition is
satisfied at any local extrenum. Furthernre, where effort is
positive, differentiationof (2.8)yields,
2 2
..e u(p') u(p') —= — < 0ar =- < 0. (2.9a,b) aa p" a/3 p"
Thesepations imply thatatany ()wherethe effort chosen
by the in3.ividualispositive, effort decreases as nore insurance is
provided until a point is reachedbevord which effort is zero. This
result isshan in Figure 3.
InsertFigure 3
Constant effortloci have slcçe ard curvature
d2 -= - rai -= r(A1-rA0). (2.lOa,b)
e da e




Defineto be the set of(a,) for which effort is positive.










[ (-& +2]for (a,3) E
= (2.13)
for(a,)
Eq.(2.13) in1ies that irdifferencecurves are convex bevorI
the zero effort line, bit be1'z the zero effort line effort may
fall off sufficiently fast as itcre insurance is providthat the
iixlifference curves are not convex. !re specifically, the
irdifference curve at a point (a,) is iwre likely to be noncorivex,
the less risk-averse are individuals (the smaller A1an A0) ,the
ure responsive the probability of accidentto effort, ard the 1er
the curvature of the p(e) function.
1st of the ar.pli1 literature on iral hazard corductsthe
analysis on the assunption (explicit or iirplicit)that litlifference
curves are convex. We have shn that doir sois restrictive.
Sample indifference curves are drawn in Figure 4.The slope
Insert Figure 4 ——
13discontiiiuity and subsuent nonconvexity in V0at the zero
effortlineoccurs if
liin =- . (2.14)
e,O
This conditionrelates to thecurvature of the prc1abilityof
accidentfunction as effort goes to zero. An examplein which this





3. Price— and Inccai-Consunçtion Lines
The possible nonconvexity of indifference curves inplies
that inccaue- and price- consumption lines maybediscontinuous.
3.1 Twoeffort levels, mac -consumption line
Wetenn q (the premiunVbenef itratio)the "pric&' of
insurance. Then an inc-consumption line (IC) correspondiog to
price q is thelocus ofpoints of maximal utility onthe faniily
of (budget)lines /3 =q(a-a0)with /3 ￿ 0 and a ￿ 0 .An
effort-fixed income-consumption lineisdefinedanalogously, but with
effortfixed.
Asin the previous section, to iirrove intuition, we first thtain
the characteristics of the two effort-fixed income-consumption lines
correspondir toslopeq ,andthendetentinehcM the correspondiog
inccae-consumption line is derived fran thetwoeffort-fixed incczt-
14consuntion lines.11 The high-effort iix me-ccrisuuption line, dert





The formula for the l—ef fort incc e-consuittion line arEl its slope
are analogcxs.
We now show that the incare—consmtion lines may be
discontinuc&s. We start with the situation shcn in Figure 5, in which
a line with slope q is tarent to the same irdifference o.itve at two
points ar meets the a-axis at .Thisis possible because the
irdifference curve has an escalloped shape. The lcMer tarency point
corresponds to high effort, the higher one to li effort.Then we
increasecr0,shiftirthe line of slope q to the right, arx
ascertain whether V1(a,/3)or v1(a,j3)increases faster alor the
respective effort-fixed incte-consunption lines.Surpose, for the




l] siitplify exposition, we examine only those sejitnts of
incate- am price-consuirtion lines for which a> 0 arEl
/3>0.
15then ,LIt ar17Hid>it 'ghere 6
a0—6 a0+8 a0+6
isan arbitrarily small positive nuither. This irrplies that the point
of maximal utility alor the line /3 =q(a-(a-6)) is on 1CL ,while
the corresporx1ir point alon the line /3= q(a- (a+6)) is on icH
Hence, in this case, the (effort-variable) incit-consumtption line
jtmips dznwards at a,fran(al,/3L) to (H,/3H) ,asaoireases.
___________________ Insert_Figure_5
It is straighforward to sh that
äV3p(U1)J (3.3)
To urbdersta1 this result, we may decanpose the effect of the increase
in a0.Priorto the increase, the irffvidual was at (aJ, /3J).Then
the initial effect of an increase in a0by thoisto cthare the
iixlividual's insurance p.]rdases to (aJ+da0j3J) which increases his
utility by (u'1)Jda0 with prthability pJ ,arxhence his expectud
utility by pJ (U' i) ida0 .Thesecx,r effect results frau ncvement from
(aJ -fda0, /3J) to sate other point on the budget line
=q(a-(ada0)).Sincethe bxlget line at (aJ,/3J)is tarent to
the iixlifference amrve there, by the envelope theorem the secrx1 effect
has no first-order inpact on utility. It follows fran (3.3) that
<=> pL(uj)L . (3.4)sii while(u'1)1> (u1)Lalonga 1uget
line, then itaçearsthat the ii me-xsmutiofl linecan iunv
either u or d'an at apoint ofdiscontinuity.Itcanbe shcn
that sucth is indeethecase.
3.2Continuum of effortlevels incxi1-CcXE.fl1VtiCflline
Similar arguments shc'i that withacontinuum ofeffort
levels,theremay bediscx)ntinuities in theircczte-consunptionline.
WhereD ar D' are the lcMer aruçerpoints of a discontinuityin
theincane-corisurrtion line, the line jurrçs dnif
pD(ui)D> pD(u1) ar up ifthe inuaiity isinthe oçosite
direction. Inaddition, we can shs'that theremay be
slcaDel seqrrnts of the incai—consunvtiofl line. The slcpe of the








whicthis positive if either the numeratorordencninatoris
native, b.it not both.
3.3Price-consuir,tionline
The price-consi.tioflline (PC)is the locusof (cr,/3)ofmaximal
utility on the family of lines /3= cpwith /3 ￿ 0 ani a ￿ 0 (i.e.,
rays natirg frczn the origininthe positive orthant). We derive the
effort-f ixed price-consunption lines ani then obtain the price-
consunption linewitheffort eniogenc*is.





ar its slope is
,
Pc l+/3A
frcau whidi we see that an effort-f ix& price-consunvtion line can be
positive1y-s1cvI. The l-ef fort uations are analogous.
We nc investigate points of discontinuity in the price-
consumption line. ¶flirn to Figure 6. We start off with a situation in
which a ray frcin the origin with slope q is tarent to the sane
irdifference curve at two points, the lcier one correspordir to high
effort ai the uçer one to 1c effort. The price-consumption line
jumps upwards at this price if ard dcnwards
if the inality is reversed. Proceedir as was done with
incai-oonsumption lines, we can sh that the price-consumption line
jumps upwards at a point of discontinuity if (U'i)HpTczH <(ui')LpLtL
ard dcMnwards if the inuality is reversed. This ineguality, too, can
go in either direction.Hence, the price-consunption line can be
discontinuous ard can I uiip either up or down at a point of
discontinuity.
Insert Figure 6
18Similar results hold for the continuum.
Finally,we note that the existence ar properties of
discontinuities in the price- ar incx*ne-consunption lines deper on
global rather than local properties of the utility ar probability-of-
acxident functions.As a result, there açpear to be no simple,
primitive restrictions on these functions (except those whicth guarantee
that irxiifference curves are everywhere convex) which guarantee that
price- ar4/or iriccm—consuitptiofl lines do not have discontinuities.
As we shall see later, the possibility of discontinuities in the
price- an incane—consuiiption lines has important inplications for the
existence ar properties of canpetitive equilibrium.
In section 2, we examined the properties of irxlifference curves
whentheexpectedutility function is separable.We n briefly
consider saneof the ccanplications that arisewhenthis assunption is
relaxed.
4.Non-separable Utility Functions.
The level of effort expered at accident avoidance maywellaffect
themarginal rateof substitution between goodsin the twoevents,












19accident ar no accident. This is vis1y the case where "effort" is
an experxliture of niney, so that uj (y ,e) =uj(y -e).Thisgreatly
cxlicates the analytics; we focus here on two interestir qualitative
results which enrge—ef fort may not be nonotonic in the anint of
insurance, ard in the continuum of effort levels case effort may not be
a continuc*s function of the anint of insurance.
4.1 Non-nonotonic effort.
The first result is seen nostly easily within the context of the
discrete effort levels nodel. Here it is possible that vHoarvL0
(defined as before, but noi with non-separable utility) intersect trore
than once, as shown in Figure 7. If this occurs, then the inlividual
will tploy one level of effort at both high ar low annts of
insurance ard the other level at internliate ancynts. The intuitive
rationale for this is that as the (ccnpensated) aircunt of insurance
provided increases, the marginal cost (disutility) of effort may fall
faster than the marginal benefit. The bouzxlary lines in a - space
between different activities can have a1nst any shape.
Insert Figure 7
4.2 Discontinucus effort.
We now show that with a continuum of effort levels, but a non-
separable utility function, effort may not be a continuis function of
the annt of insurance, even though the urderlyin utility ard
prthability-of -accident functions are "well-behaved."




(-U0+U1)p' = - (—(1-p)+ p)




=( - — + —) p'+(-U0+U1)p"
the marginal benefit curve need not be dcMnward-slOpin.Increases in
effort may increase the utility difference between theaccidentani
no-accidenteventsarilhenceincrease themarginal return th further
effort.Similarly, since






+ — —) p'
themarginal cost curveneed not be upc1ard-slopirP. Ifthemarqinal
costto effort is lerinthe no-accidentevent, nreeffort makes the
no-accident event imore likely, ani hence maylcMer the marginalcost of
effort.Thus,atany(a,)there may be multiplelocalcçtimal
effort levels.
The possibilityofmultiple localoptimal effortlevels for a
given(a,/3)considerably octplicates the analysis, since theeffort
level chosen by an iniividual may charge discontinuously as aan $
arealtered.
Agecametric interpretation ofthisdiscontinuity isprovidedin
Figure 8. Considertwo fixed-effortiixlifferericecurves, corresponding
to different levelsof effort b.it the sane level of utility, which
intersecttwice (in a-space).Consider e(e1,e2) .Ifat
21-- e-. e-
(a,/3) , EUis convex in e ,thenV (a,/3) =V(a,f3)>
ve(a,p).At(a,/3), effortwill switch discontinuously between e1
arx e2.If, hcever, EU is concave in e at (a, /3),thenthere
can be no such discontinuity.
Insert Figure 8
5. Irriplications for Deitiaitl Functions.
Quasi-concavity of in3ifference maps is important in conventional
theory because without it, demari functions are discontinuous.The
analysis of section 3 can be interpreted as establishing thatif
insurance firms offer individuals "linear" or price insurance
contracts--a payment of a with premium aq --the demand for insurance
(and hence effort) may be discontinuous in q.Itis also easy to
establish thatthedemandfunctionfor insurance may be discontinuous
inotherprices (e.g. the costof autaiobile repairs)as well.
Furthernire,an increase in thepriceof insurance can lead to a
discontinuousincrease in insurance pirchased (ard a corresponding
discontinuous decrease in effort) rather than the expected decrease)-3
6. The Badly-Behaved Zero Profit Locus
In this section, we show that with itoral hazard the set of
feasible contracts, thoseatwhich profitsarenon-native, which we
term the feasibility set,isnever convex. We focus our attention on
-3With separable utility functions, insurance purciiases decrease
with the price of insurance and effort increases, except at points of
discontinuity in the price-consumption line.This property does not
extend to non—separable utility functions.Theseresults can be
obtainedstraightforwardly fran differentiation of the first-order
conditions of the individual's effort choiceproblem.
22the shape of the miter bouriiary of the set,which ireferto as the
resxe cc*traint or, where aprcipriate,the zero profit 1ocis (ZPL.
Weagain divide the analysis into two cases, with two activities,
the other with a continuum of effort levels.
6.1 TWo effort levels, setarable utility.
When high effort is experxled, the effort-fixed zero profitlocus
is
13(1_pH) —apR=0, (6.1)
which is a ray fran the origin with slope HZero profits
1-p
are made when the ratio of the premium tothe net paycxit, which we
have tenid the price of insurance, equals the probabilityof accident
divided by the probability of no accident. When 1effort is
expended, the corresporxling effort-fixed zero profitloucs is a ray
fran the origin with slope Since with la'i effort, the
1-p
probability of accident is higher, a higher pricemust be charged
for insurance to break even. The effort-fixed zero profitloci
are shn in Figure 9.
InsertFigure 9
We nc.z derive the zero profit loc'is witheffort endogenous.
Define the feasibility set contingent on high effortto be the set of
(a,/3)for which expected profits are non-neqative when higheffort is
expended, and denote it byH r1 letbe the set of (a, /3)for
which the individual chooses high effort; it was shownin section 2
that this is the area below 0H,LDefineL and accordingly
for low effort, and to be the feasibilityset with effort
eniogenous. A point(a, (3)isin if either it is in 'Haixi the
23iix3.ividual expers high effort there g itisin .Lar the
iniividual experxs l effort there; i.e.=fl) n£)
Thefeasibility set with effort enogencus is shzn by the cross-
hatched area in Figure 9. The zero profit loc'..s with effort erxiogenous
is the bouixary of .Fraithe Figure, it is clear that the
feasibility set with effort erdogenis is not convex.
6.2 Continuum of effort levels, separable utility.
The zero profit locus is
(l—p(e))--ap(e) =0. (6.2)












Several properties of the zero profit locus for this case
are generally worthy of note.
1.The zero profit locus is continus.
2.The curvature of the zero profit locus depeits onthird
derivativesof the prcbability-of-acCident function,
restrictions on which have no persuasive econanic justification.
3.There are nonetheless restrictions on the feasible shape of the
24zero profit locus. First,beycrd the zeroeffort line, the
zero profitlocusis (3(1-n) -= 0.Secorxl,the zero
profit locus incles the origin ar has a slope
thirdall points on the line
sennt joining a point inon the zero profit locus ar
the originmust lie in the feasibility set.15ilatedly, atany
point on a positively-sloped sennt ofthe zero profitlocusat
which effort is positive, the ZPL is steeper than the ray
joining the origin to that point.16 føjth, the zero profit
locus can have an infinite slope ani backward-bending segments,
but cannot have zero slope.-7
14pJnie, with separable and event-inlepeixlent utility,the
slope of the ZPL at the origin exce&sthe slope of the indifference
curve there (recall (2.7)).
15Label the point on the ZPL (ao,13o)anda point on the line
sinent(a1,131)
.Bothhave the same price of insurance, but since
effortdecreasesasonencves cut along thelinesegment, the
probability of accident is higher at (ao,(3o)thanat (a11(31)
Sincezero profitsare made at (ao,(3o),positiveprofits must be itade
at (a1,/31)
16The slope of the zeroprofitlocusisgiven by (6.3'), thatofa
linejoiningthe origin to the point (a,13)onthe ZPLp(e(a,J3))/(l-
p(e(a,13))
3-7Considerincreasing (3frcxasate point on the ZPL,holdinga
fixed.This hasan ambigucuseffectonprofits.Theincreasein /3
witheffort constant, increases profits. ait the increasein (3with
a constant, 1iers effort which effect byitself causes profits to
fall. When the former effect dczninates, the ZPLis positively-sloped;
when the latter dcininates itisnegatively-sloped; and when the two are
offsetting, itisinfinitely-sloped.
Now consider increasing a ,holding /3 istant. Both effects
operate to decrease profits, which iirçliesthat the ZPL cannot have a
zero slope.
254. The feasibility set is never convex.18
6.3 Continuum ofeffort levels, non-separable utility.
Wehave seen that non-separability of the expected utility
function can cause effort to be discontinuous in the parameters of the
insurance contract. This can result in the feasibility set not beirrj
connected, and in points on the boundary of the feasibility set havir
positive profits.
Part II: Li1ications
Inthis part of thepaper,we undertake two tasks: First, we shc.i
that thefactthatboth indifference curves and the feasibility set are
"badly behaved" has stror ilications for the existence and nature of
equilibrium; and second, we illustrate that our analysis of insurance
markets can be directly applied to other markets, inclx1irg credit and
labor markets.
7. Existence and Properties of Eciuilibrium
A thorxh analysis of the existence and prcçerties of equilibrium
turns out to be rnarkably cp1ex, even for the simplest case of
Theslceof the ZPL beyond the zero effort line is p (0) /(1-
p(O)) ,whileat the origin it is p(e(O,O))/(l—p(e(O,O)), which is
smaller. Hence, a necessary condition for the feasibility set to be
/3
convexis that —atthe point of intersection of the ZPL
a
p(0)
and the ZELbe strictly lessthan .Bitsincethe point
1—p (0)
/3p(O)
is on the ZPLJ, —= there.
al—p(O)
26separable, event-independent utility. A reasonablycciplete analysis
is provided in rnott and Stiglitz (1987a). Here ouraim is to use the
gecitriC and analytic tools developedthus far in the paper to
illuminate sans of the issues involved. To siiilify, wecontinue to
assuins separable utility.
The existence and properties of equilibrium arecrucially
dependent on what information isavailable to insurance finns. There
are three itris of information of concernto an insurance finn when
insuring a client:i) whether or nottheaccident actually orred;
ii) the effort undertaken by the clientto prevent the accident; and
iii) if effortis notobservable, the client' s purchases of insurance
fran otherfinns.
Inour analysis, we have assumed, and shallcontinueto assuire,
thatfinns cannot observe theirclients' accident-preventioneffort at
all,1-9 and can observe perfectly and without cost whether anaccident
occurred.
With respect to the other iten of information, wetreat only the
two extmts:i) where a firm can costlessly observeitsclients'
insurance purchases from other finns—we ternthis the "observable
insurance purchases" case or simply the "observability" case;and ii)
where a finn cannot observe its clients' purchasesfrom other firir,
the "unobservable insurance purchases" or "unobservability"case. This
information is relevant since in the fonrer case thefirm can ration
its clients' purchases of insurance, whereas in the latteritcannot.
19H8itran [1979) considers the case in which firs can observe
theirclients' effort with noise.
27The existence ard prcerties of equilibrium also depen:1 on what
insurance contracts are der admissible.The set of admissible
contracts clearly deperds on what is cservable; if the quantity of
insurance pirchased at other firn is not cservable, then admissible
contracts cannot directly restrict the anøint prthased at other firms.
&ittheremay be otherrestrictionson the set of admissible contracts
which are imtivatedbyother considerations:Should neqative
iisurance20 or raixic*u jpgp21bealic? Should latent policies--
policies which are not purchased in equilibrium but seive to deter
entry—be permitted? The nature of equilibrium turns outto deperxl
critically on the answers to such questions.When the set of
admissiblecontractsis exparded, notonlymay there be new equilibria,
butalsothe newly-admissible contracts may upset the original
equilibria (this occurs, for example, when the setofadmissible
contractsis expanied frcan price contracts to price arKi quantity
contracts).It is .ir view thatwhat contractsshould be treated as
admissible depenis on context (ard in particular, on transactions
costs) 22
20ere the iwlividual pays when an accident occurs ani receives a
payout when it does not.
2lpett ani Stiglitz [l987b) discuss randcaninsurance with
cbsei:vabilityof insurance purchases.
22For instance, neqative insurance requires verifyingthatan
accident has not occurred, which may be far itore costly than verifyir
thatone has occurred; rajxlczriization nayrequireverification that the
firmis in fact rardcmiizir accordir to the specifiedpi:thabilities,
again a taskwhichis far harder than simply verifyir that it pays a
given anntina given situation.
287.1. Observabilitv: exclusive contract eauilibrium.
Stien it is feasible for firn8 to restrict the quantityof
insurance (in particular, if the quantity of insurancewhich an
jrxIividual buys is thservable), equilibrium will becharacterized by
exclusive contracts, in which the irxuividual will ,irdiaseall of his
insurance frm a sir1e provider. The equilibriumis at the point of
maxiimim utility on the feasibility set.
Insert Figure 10
Figure 10 shs three possible exclusive contractequilibria for
the two activities case—e' ,e", .Ate", thepoint of
intersection of the high effort zero profit locus ar1 the switchir
locus, theiriividualwould liketo pirchase itore insurance at the
goirprice(pH/ (i_pH))but were the firm to offer aitional
insurance, he would switch to a 1i level of effort,an the policy
wouldmake aloss. Thisresultextens to the case where there is a
continuum of effort levels. We sh.i&i in the previous sectionthatat
anypointon a positively-sloped snntofthe ZPLatwhich effort is
positive, the ZPL is steeper than the price line joinirthe origin to
that point.This establishes thatcciripetitiveequilibrium will
nonnallyentailrationirof insurance, when itisfeasible, as well as
positive effort ar partialinsurance (i.e.,U'0>
7.2Priceeauilibrium
Asecond form of equilibrium, which is relevantwith
unobservability, is thatwhere insurance firn simplyoffer price
29contracts, and do not restrict the quantity of insurance. Cr earlier
analysis can be us& th derive several important results.
A zero profit price equilibrium, if it exists, must be at the
intersection of the zero profit locus and the price-consumption line.
Because the price-consumption line may jump across the zero profit
locus (recall section 3), a zero profit price eauilibrium may not
exist.
%hen the zero profit price eauilibrium exists, the level of effort
is zero with accidents which decrease or leave undiarx the mtrqinal
utilityof incorr at each level of inccne. Thisfollisfrciim thefact
that ina price equilibrium,individuals set the price, q ,ealto




Hence, u' o= u'1;i.e. thereisfullinsuranceat the zeroprofit
price equilibrium. Thisimplies that if accidentsdecreaseorleave
unchar&1 the marginal utility of inca, then
U0 ￿ U1 ,
whichin turn implies, from the first-order conditionforeffort,
(2.8), that effort must be zero and that the equilibrium price is
—p(0) q*_
We ni identify a set of sufficient conditions for the non-
existence of a zero profit price equilibrium. tfine the full
insurance line (FIL) th be the locus of (a,/) for which U'0 =U'1
From the above discussion it follcs that if a zero profit price
30equili.briuiu exists, it liesatthe point of intersecticzt of the ZPLar
the FIL; we label this point E .Nrisurcose that: i) the expected
utility uncti.on is event-ierent; ii =..
e.Jo(e)
ard iii) urn p' (e) =-coFran(iii) ard (2.11), it fo1l'zs that the
eO
zero effort line is characterized by u0 =U1 .FurtherTtre,with
event-irdeperKient utility, the ZEL ard FIL coincide ard satisfy
a +13 = d.Anecessary cordition for E to be an equilibrium
is that the irdifference curves be convex near E .3.itwe have
already seen, that urder cordition (ii),irdifference curves are
nonconvex in the neighborhood of the zero effort line,ard that E is
on the zero effort line.
TWO further points should be noted.First, convexity of the
injifference curves near E does not ensure the existenceof a zero
profit price equilibrium; to establish existence, a globalanalysis is
required. Secord, the non-existence of a zero profit priceequilibrium
does not imply the non-existence of a price equilibrium. InArnott ard
Stiglitz [1987a) we sh'i that a price equilibrium alwaysexists, but
may entail zero insurance or positive profits.
7.3 Other uilibrium forms.
The fact that an insurance firm cannot observe insurance purchases
fran other firms does not itan that equilibrium must be a price
equilibrium.Since the insurance firm can observe its in sales of
insurance to an irxiividual, by insistir that the inlividual purchase a
large quantity, it can attempt to discouragethe irdividual from
purchasir from other firms. We refer to equilibriain which fints
31offer only quantity contracts as Q-equilibria, ar equilibria in which
sate finte offer price contracts arxi other quantity contracts as B-
equilibria.In Arnottar1Stiglitz [1987a] we sh thatQ-equilibria
an P-iilibria iray not exist; that is,given any setofinsurance
contracts,each of which at least breaks even, there exists a new
contract which if of fere:1 would be xrdiase ar make a profit.
(The entry of this new contract would, hcever, result in other
Insert Figure 11
fint making a loss.)The non-existence ofequilibriumhinges
critically on the properties of the inccme-consurrtion lines.
To see this, assume that utility is separable arI event-
iix3.eperxlentarxl consider the situation where there is a single
inc.iir,ent finn in the market which offers a quantity policy. When can
this be an equilibrium? If the incumbent's policy lies strictly inside
the feasibility set, there exists a small, supplemantaiy policy
(possibly with neqative insurance) which would be bought ar be
profitable.Thus, the incumbent's policymustlie on the ZPL .The
incumbent's policy must also lie on the price-consumption line.
Sur.cose, to the contrary, that the incumbent offers the policy G
which lies on the ZPL but not on the priceconsuiitionline, as
illustrata in Figure 12.Then the surplelTentary policy GA will be
urchase (since A is bel the irdifference curve through G); an
32if G is ll encxh, it will make a profit,because the effort at
A is aly slightly lcMer than at G bitthe inplicit price of policy
GA is significantly higher than that ofG. S1i profits at A are
rative, while the suleitntaiy policymakes a profit, policy G
makes a loss. Thus, if iilibrium existswith a s]nle incuntent firm
offerir a quantity policy, the policyitust lie at the point of
intersection of the ZPL aiti the prioe-oonsuiiptiOflline. If the price-
consunption line does not intersect the ZPL,such an equilibrium does
not exist.If the price-consumption line does intersectthe ZPL, it
does so at the point E23 ,aniE may be a Q-equilibriurfl. A necessary
coriiition for E to be a Q-equilibriUm is that no partof the inccane-
consultVtiOn line correspordirig to the priceq* =P(O)(0)
belcM
(i.e., corresponcth to a higher utility level)E lies in the
interior of the feasibility set. This is illustratedin Figure 12.
The contract B is preferred to E ,arxlsince B lies on the
incre—cOflSUITPtiOfl line correspordi-r to priceq* =-p(o)'
theirxlividual will prefer B to B plus E .Sincealso policy
B by itself is profitable, it upsets E
12
When we further ircdify the analysis to allowfor latent policies,
a much richer set of equilibria emarges;an:I the set of equilibria
inclrdes positive profit equilibria.
8. Alications
23pecall that the point E is the point of intersection ofthe
zero profit locus ard the full insuranceline, ard that when the price-
consuitption line intersects the zero profit locus,it does so at E
33We have cast r presentation of the basic analytics of ural
hazard in the context of an explicit insurance market. In this
section, we wish to shcM that, with only a transformation of variables,
the analysis can be employed to cast light on issues in the principal
-agent literature. Thcigh the basic framawork of our analysis can be
applied in many contexts, the apprcriate uilibrium concept (the set
of admissible contracts) may well differ, because what is easily
observable in one market may not be so easily observable in another;
e.g., while itmaybe possible to restrict insurance p.ircthases from
other firs, itmaynot be possible to restrict employment with other
employers, or borrcMing from other creditors. In the discussion belcM,
we shci hc the iwdel can be reinterpreted to investigate sharecropping
ath credit contracts, but we do not consider the appropriate
iilibrium concept for each of the markets.
First, consider thecontractbetween a risk-neutral larxilord ar a
risk-averse laborer (e.g.,Stiglitz [1974]) in a competitive market.
Shaildthe laborer:i)rent the land, thereby receivingoutplt less
rent; ii)be paidastraight wage for farmingtheland; or iii) share
tpit with the landlord?The output fromthelandisa random
variablearx:1 (in thesense of first-orderstochasticdominance)
increaseswith the laborer's effort.Moral hazard arises in the
contract because the landlord is unable to observe the laborer's
effort. Suppose, forpurposes of exposition,that there are only two
output levels, with the probability of the higher outputlevel
increasing in the laborer's effort. Let M andxL denote the high
and 1cM c*.itpits respectively; R denote the landlord' s required average
34return on the lard;ai i: denote the tenant's cx,nsunption in the
high- ai low- cxitpit events, respectively;ai e denote the tenant's
effort. Then with the transfonnation of variablesxH -R<->w,
xL <>d ,yH<>w3 ,yL<->w-d+a ,theprciDlexn is identical to the one
analyzed in the paper.The rental contract correspors to no
insurance, the wage contract to full insurance,ar sharecro.pirg to
partial insurance. Cur earlier result that,where exclusivity can be
enforced, partial insurance is typical in equilibrium,corresporxs to
the result in the current context that, where thelariilord can be sure
that the worker will not obtain insurance against outp.itvariability
fran a third party, sharecroppifl will typically occur.
Secorxl, consider the starxard credit contract (e.g.,Stiglitz ar
Weiss [1981)).The borrower obtains nney fran the ler1er ar uses
only this iney to finance a project.The project is either
successful, yieldir return R ,orunsuccessful, yie1dir a return of
zero. Moral hazard occurs because the probabilityof success depers
on the effort of the borrower, whichis unobservable to the leixier.
The borrower starts with wealth W. We contrast the consequencesof a
limited liability loan, with collateral C aixi interest ratei ,with
an unlimited liability loan with rate ofinterest r Thelimited
liability loan increases consumption in the eventthat the project is
unsuccessful, bit because i > ,itreduces consumption in the
event the project is successful. Thus, the limited liabilityloan is
essentially an unhilrLtted liability loan canbinedwith insurance. With
the transformation, W+R-L (l+) <->w ,R<->d
35W+R-L (l+i)<->w-/3 ,W-C,<->w-d+c, theproblemisidenticalto the
insurance problem analyzel in the paper. In theinsurancecontext,the
exclusive contractequilibrium always(with separable, event-
in1eperentutility)entails positive insurance. The analogous result
here isthat a limitliabilityloanalways dczninates an un1imita
liabilityloan. notheranalogous result isthat if the len:lercan
enforce exclusivity(in this context,can ensure thatthe borrower does
notobtain an additional loan, oradditionalinsurance againstthe
failureofthe project,frcna third party) the equilibrium contract
will entailcreditrationing, in the sense that at the
implicit price of iiance q =L(l±r
,theborrower would
like to Obtain a larger loan, but is unable to firxl a lerer who
will agree to this.
A similar analysis holds ifinsteadof choosing an effort level,
the borrower has a choice of the riskiness of the two projects, both of
which require an investnnt L. One project has, say, a higher return
ifsuccessful,bit a lower probability of success. We assm that the
magnitte of thereturncannot be observI (otherwise, in those cases
where theprojectwas successful, thelerercould infer what project
the borrower had uixlertaken). If the borrower ur1ertaJces the safe(s)
project,hisexpect utilityis
U(W+RS -L(l+i))(lpS)÷ U(W -C)p5
while iftheborrower urslertakes therisky(r) project, his expect
utility is
u(w+Rr_L(l÷i))(1_pr) +U(W-C)p'
36where p is the probability of the project failing.The fixed-
project irK1ifference curves, shc*jn in Figure 13, arewell-behaved. We
can define the switching locus along which theiniividual switches frcaii
the safe to the risky project, •Abovethe line (l'z collateral),
thein3.ividual unertakes the risky project. The zero profit locusfor
the bank is that where the expected return to the loan (l-p) hr-p (Lr-C)
is equal to the opportunity cost of furs, L .Asdrawn, the
equilibrium, Z ,willbe characterized by rationing ard an exclusive
contract, where feasible. Since the implicit price ofinsurance is
Insert Figure 13
q=L(1r)-c ,whilethe iir1icit quantity is L(l+) —C
rationing has several behavioral inpilcations.Not only is the
borrower unable to obtain as large a loan as he wouldlike at the
actuarially fair price, bit he is also unable to obtain the equilibrium
loan with less collateral. Furthentre, even though thereis an excess
dr for loanable furis, lerders will not respord by raisingthe
interest rate, i ,sincedoing so has adverse incentive effects.
9.Concli...iixComments
If one believes, as we do, that incentive/itoral hazard problems
are pervasive in our economy, then it is importantto construct itdels
exploring the existence ard properties of market equilibriumtaking
these problems into account.It would be nice if we could simply
assi.m that the relevant functions had the necessarymathematical
37properties to al1i a convenient borriir of concepts, itthcds, and
results frun starxard ccanpetitive equilibrium analysis. Such,
unfortunately, does not turn ait to be the case.
The cbjective of this paper has been to develop the basic
analytics of the economics of itcral hazard.In spite of rnakir
standard convexity assumptions concernir the uix1erlyin utility
functions and technology, we have established that insurance
indifference curves are in general not convex and feasibility sets are
never convex. Effort may care discontinucsly as the paraneters of
the insurance contract are varied. Jnd even when strong conditions are
imposed on the forms of the underlying functions, price-consumption and
incat—consi.imption lines as well as dand curves may exhibit
discontinuities.
We have suggested that these "perversities" have sate profc*.irxl
implications for the existence and nature of equilibrium.For
instance, equilibrium will be characterized by exclusive contracts
entailing quantity rationing, when these are enforceable. When they
are not, other contract foni will be seen. When only price contracts
are offered, there may be no equilibrium with insurance in which firms
make zero profits.And when each finn rations the quantity of
insurance it sells, bot cannot chserve the quantities sold by other
fint, no equilibrium may exist.
Thc*igh we have ccLiched our analysis in terns of insurance markets,
the results have a direct bearing on all markets in which uncertainty
and incentive problens are both present; we illustrated this by shcing
hi the imxiel can be adapted to analyze labor and credit markets. The
38further investigation of the pervasive perversities which we have
urovered here, ai their fliçlications for equilibria urer a variety
of institutional settirs, retiain issues for future research.
39Apeniix: A Brief Fview of the Earlier Literature
It is unusual to have a literature reviecz at the er of a paper.
Hever, this paper is self-contained, ar it is easier to explain here
what contrib.ition earlier papers made.
Pauly [1974] presented the basic two-c*.itcares moral hazard model.
He assun1 event-ilTlepelxlent utility ai convexity of irifference
curves in a- space.He identified ard explained the exclusive
contract equilibrium with servability ard the zero profits price
equilibrium with unobservability.
Helpian arxl Laffont [1975] broke new grourd in recognizir the
non—convexities to which moral hazard can give rise. For the n-cxitcare
case, they proved the existence of an exclusive contract equilibrium
with observability, ar*:1 of a zero profit price equilibrium with
unobservability when irdifference curves are convex in the analog to
a-/3space.They also presented an example de.rronstratirg the non-
existence of a zero profit price equilibrium with unobservability when
irdifference curves are non—convex. They did not, hciever, investigate
the non-existence probl further, or consider alternative equilibrium
concepts.
st of the subsequent literature has focussed on the principal-
agent prcbln with a continuum of c*itccais, on the assunptions of
convex irdifference curves ani continuity of effort in the paramaters
of the insurance contract.
Stiglitz (1983] provided an overview of the authors' preliminary
work on moral hazard ard introduced the analysis of price equilibria.
Heliwig (1983] argued that in the case of uncbservability of insurance
r*1rdases, there is a considerably larger set of cardidate equilibriathan the price equilibria; in particular, he csidered Q-equilibria
ar Smforiof -equilibria for the case of two discrete effort
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aigure 3:Constant effort loci with a separable
utilityfunction.
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Figure 6:Rat.'from origin tangent to same indifference









Fcure7: without separability, effort ma: not be




- :oure3:Withnon—secarabl- utitLt1anda :ontinuum ofeffort
levels, some effort levels maybe dominatedand






Figure :Theresource constraint and the feasibility set,








Figure10: Possible exclusive contract ecuilibria,
two activities, separable utility.
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Figure 13: Credit rationing withmoral hazardwhen
the lender cannot observe the riskrness
of the £:ro:ect chosen cv the borrower.
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